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This thesis tests empirically whether the political preferences of Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) members, indicated by party affiliation, the partisan direction of donations 
to political campaigns, and the party of the President affect their voting behavior when setting 
monetary policy. I use two main empirical strategies in this project. The first is a linear 
probability model that examines the correlation between a range of background characteristics of 
FOMC members--including political affiliation, educational attainment, and work 
background--on the probability of casting a dissent vote against the majority decision of the 
FOMC at a particular meeting.  
The second approach controls for the state of the economy and focuses on whether an 
FOMC member’s vote on interest rates at a particular meeting was for an increase, a decrease, or 
no change.  To control for the state of the economy and its effect on FOMC interest rate 
decisions, I use predictions from Taylor-like rules that translate measures of economic activity 
and inflation into prescriptions for interest rates.  I then use a multinominal logit specification to 
assess how partisan affiliation (and several other factors) affect voting choices after controlling 
for the Taylor-Rule prescriptions.  To implement both empirical strategies for this analysis, I 
constructed a unique data set that ranges from 1970 to 2018, where each observation is a 
person-meeting. 
My somewhat surprising results indicate that partisanship emerges based on the party of 
the sitting President rather than through the party affiliation of FOMC members.  In particular, 
during Republican Administrations, FOMC members downweight the signal from economic 
conditions when considering decreases in interest rates and also are considerably more likely to 
3 
 vote for rate decreases than is the case during Democratic Administrations. Additionally, I find 
that my bank president variable is no longer significant, which is surprising because the prior 





















 1. Introduction 
The nonpartisan character of the Federal Reserve is crucial to the fulfillment of its dual 
mandate “to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
long-term interest rates.”  Recently, the political independence of the Fed has been under attack. 1
President Donald Trump has made his displeasure with the Federal Reserve and its chairman, 
Jerome Powell, for continuing to raise the federal funds rate quite clear over the past few months. 
Since December 2015, the Fed has been slowly raising interest rates, and the decision of the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in December 2018 to raise rates again prompted 
condemnation from Trump. In late November 2018, Trump told the ​Washington Post ​that “I’m 
doing deals and I’m not being accommodated by the Fed.”  The president has broken with 2
tradition by criticizing the Federal Reserve, and its chairman whom he nominated in 2018, so 
publicly. Some reports even stated that Trump was considering an attempt to remove Powell as 
chairman, even though it is unclear that such an action would be legal.  If Trump were to remove 
Powell, it would be a further blow to the Fed’s independence. All together, Trump’s actions call 
into question the political independence of the Federal Reserve. 
Continuing on the theme of not valuing the political independence of the Federal 
Reserve, in March 2019, President Trump indicated his desire to have Stephen Moore, one of his 
former campaign advisors, fill a seat on the Board of Governors. Though Moore has not been 
officially nominated as of writing this, this decision has been met with unease from bankers, 
economists, and financial market participants, many of whom claim Moore is unqualified for the 
1 ​Federal Reserve Act, Public-Law 63-43 and amendments. 23 December, 1913. Fraser: Discover Economic 
History. Accessed 24 April, 2019. 
2 ​Christopher Condon, “A Timeline of Trump’s Quotes on Powell and the Fed,” Bloomberg, Accessed 24 April, 
2019.  
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 job. Additionally, Moore is overtly partisan and has indicated that he would be susceptible to 
undue influence from the Trump administration. After the federal funds rate was raised in 
December, Moore asked in an interview with CNN, “Who is the Fed responsive to, if not the 
president?”  However, since his nomination Moore has backpedaled on this statement, and said 3
that the Federal Reserve must be independent of the president.  In an interview with Politico, 4
Moore stated “I will be independent” but later confessed that he was a “...big fan of Donald 
Trump’s.”  This kind of behavior from the president and his potential nominees raises concerns 5
about the continued political independence of the Federal Reserve. Ultimately, Moore’s 
nomination was scuttled, but the process clearly indicated the type of person the President would 
like to appoint to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 
Monetary policy is conducted by the Federal Reserve, specifically the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve in Washington, D.C., and on a rotating basis, five Presidents of the Fed’s 12 
regional Reserve Banks. A key tool through which the FOMC implements policy is the federal 
funds rate, the rate at which banks can borrow money from each other overnight.  The rate can be 
lowered to give a boost to the economy during a recession, and can be raised if inflation gets too 
high. Changing the rate changes the cost of borrowing money from other banks, which is a 
critical factor in determining the supply of loanable funds. Lowering the rate grows the economy 
because it makes it less expensive for businesses and individuals to borrow. 
3 ​Victoria Guida, “Trump’s pick of Moore for Fed sparks concern among bankers,” Politico, Accessed 24 April, 
2019.  
4 ​Ibid. 
5 ​Ibid.  
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 It is imperative that the Federal Reserve remain politically independent. Employees of the 
Federal Reserve are prohibited from running for political office and soliciting donations for 
campaigns. These policies exist because the Federal Reserve must be independent in order to 
make decisions that are best for the long term growth of the economy. The Federal Reserve is 
apolitical in theory, but in practice, ​political considerations could affect monetary policy in a 
number of ways. First, the FOMC could, for example, decide to lower the rate in the last few 
months before an election to give the economy a temporary boost, helping the incumbent party in 
power. While this may be a politically expedient strategy, it does not necessarily make good 
economic policy. It would be dangerous for FOMC members to be taking direction from the 
president or other government officials, and could have serious ramifications on the economy for 
years to come. As for the literature on the subject, previous papers (including Bade and Parkin 
(1982)  and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991)  ) have shown that central banks with a 6 7
greater degree of independence typically experience lower inflation. Alesina and Summers have 
the same finding, but do not conclude that unemployment or economic growth are correlated 
with central bank independence.  8
For example, we can see historically that there can be serious economic consequences 
when the Fed is not acting independently. In the months before the 1972 election, President 
Richard Nixon pressured chairman Arthur Burns to lower the federal funds rate to aid in his 
reelection effort. Burns complied with the request. Nixon won the election, but at a great cost to 
6 Robin Bade and Michael Parkin, “Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy,” Department of Economics, 
University of Western Ontario, 1988​.  
7 ​Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, “Institutions and Policies,” Economic Policy, 6, 13, 
Oxford University Press, 1991.  
8 ​Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers, “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some 
Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 25, 2, Ohio State University Press, 1993. 
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 the economy. Inflation skyrocketed in the 1970s, and ultimately was lowered through a period of 
extreme tightening under chairman Paul Volcker in the early 1980s. This caused unemployment 
to rise as a result, and caused an uproar among many who lost their jobs as a result.  At this point 9
in time, Volcker made a judgement that reducing inflation was more important than keeping 
unemployment low, and this decision had important political implications. Taking an even 
broader perspective, FOMC members preferences on unemployment vs. inflation may have a 
political component as well. 
These issues raise the interesting question of whether and how partisanship has affected 
monetary policy decisions in the past, and my thesis explores more implicit political and 
background influences on the decisions of monetary policy makers. My first empirical strategy 
relates to the prior literature that has found that among central bankers, FOMC members 
appointed by Democratic presidents tend to be more dovish, or willing to tolerate higher inflation 
in favor of lower unemployment, than those appointed by Republican presidents, who are 
generally more hawkish, or willing to tolerate higher unemployment in favor of lower inflation. I 
will test empirically whether there is any correlation between political and background 
characteristics of FOMC members on the probability of casting a dissent vote. I measure political 
leanings by a member’s party affiliation and whether or not they have donated to federal political 
campaigns and parties.  
During a FOMC meeting, each member casts a vote for the policy action recommended 
by the group, or dissents. Dissents can happen for many reasons. Sometimes members dissent for 
looser policy because they believe the federal funds rate should be lower, meaning they are 
9 ​James Pethokoukis, “What’s wrong with imposing political pressure on the Fed,” American Banker, Accessed 24 
April, 2019.  
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 willing to tolerate higher inflation in favor of lower unemployment. Members also dissent for 
tighter policy because they believe the federal funds rate should be higher, meaning they are 
willing to tolerate higher unemployment in favor of lower inflation. Dissents can also happen for 
other reasons, including over wording of the statement that explains the policy decision, or 
disagreement about the use of unconventional monetary policy tools that were first employed 
during and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  For this particular project, I limit my analysis to 10
dissents for looser and tighter monetary policy.  
Though the previous literature has extensively focused on finding correlations between 
background characteristics of FOMC members on the probability of casting a dissent vote, few 
papers have controlled for the state of the economy. To gauge whether policy is tight or loose, I 
will use a “Taylor Rule” as a benchmark.  A Taylor Rule is a formula that generates a 
prescription for how the FOMC should set interest rates given measures of GDP and inflation. 
Using these prescriptions as a benchmark, “tight” policy would be an interest rate setting higher 
than the prescription of the rule and “loose” policy would be an interest rate setting lower than 
the prescription of the rule.  This paper adds to the existing literature because no previous papers 
have controlled for partisan campaign contributions, or used a Taylor Rule framework to assess 
whether political affiliation and background affects monetary policy decisions. 
My thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 is reviews the literature on how political 
characteristics impact FOMC voting. Section 3 describes the data collection for my original 
dataset. Section 4 describes my empirical strategies and regressions. Section 5 explains my 
10 ​David C. Wheelock, “FOMC Dissents: Why Some Members Break from Consensus,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis, Accessed 24 April, 2019.  
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 findings. Section 6 highlights limitations of my results and directions for future work. Section 7 






















 2. Literature Review 
In “Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves, and Swingers,” Michael Bordo and 
Klodiana Istrefi study the effect of different background characteristics on whether FOMC 
members are more hawkish (willing to tolerate higher unemployment in favor of lower inflation), 
or more dovish (willing to tolerate higher inflation in favor of lower unemployment). In 
particular, they examine the effect of the political party of the President on the relative 
hawkishness or dovishness of Board Members. Bordo and Istrefi find that FOMC members 
appointed by Democrats are more likely to be dovish, and that members appointed by 
Republicans are more likely to be hawkish.  Havrilesky and Gildea find that some members of 11
the Board of Governors would vote in a manner aligning with the preferences of the President 
who appointed them, especially when the Fed chair was from the opposite party. When 
appointed by Democrats or supply-side Republicans like President Ronald Reagan, these 
governors were more likely to dissent for looser policy, while those appointed by 
non-supply-side Republicans were more likely to dissent for tighter policy.   12
This relates to my thesis because one of the questions I am exploring is how political 
party affiliation affects FOMC voting behavior. I also have decided to control for campaign 
contributions because those who have donated to political parties and campaigns may have a 
stronger partisan affiliation than those who do not make such contributions. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that campaign contributions would be a stronger measure of party attachment than 
party affiliation.  
11 ​Michael Bordo and Klodiana Istrefi, “Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves, and Swingers,” Working 
Paper 24650, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018. 
12 ​Thomas Havrilesky and John Gildea, “Screening FOMC Members For Their Biases And Dependability,” 
Economics and Politics, 3, 2, 1991.  
11 
 I am also exploring whether there is a differential effect in voting behavior between 
members of the Board of Governors and bank presidents. Susan Belden explored whether these 
two groups voted differently, specifically focusing on dissent votes, in her paper “Policy 
Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes.” She finds that bank 
presidents are more likely to dissent in favor of tighter policy, while members of the Board of 
Governors are more likely to dissent in favor of looser policy.  Because dissent votes are far 13
more interesting than non-dissent votes due to their rarity, I choose to focus on the impact of 
different characteristics of FOMC members on the probability of casting a dissent vote in favor 
of either looser or tighter monetary policy.  
However, Belden’s analysis is limited to only dissent votes, and for this reason has been 
criticized by other economists.  By only focusing on dissent votes, the results could be biased 14
because Belden “...ignores influences that cause a member to go along with the majority in split 
decisions.”  Therefore when building my dataset, I collected not only dissent votes but all votes 15
cast by FOMC members regarding the federal funds rate between 1970 and 2018. 
Havrilesky and Gildea also critique Belden’s analysis because though they admit that she 
acknowledges that the state of the economy clearly played a role in the number of dissent votes 
cast, they point out that she does not control for the state of the economy. In their commentary on 
Belden’s paper, they control for the state of the economy via two variables, the change in 
inflation for tightness dissents and the change in the unemployment rate for ease dissents. In their 
results, Havrilesky and Gildea find that dissents for tighter monetary policy are more frequent 
13 Susan Belden, “Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes,” Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 21, 4, Ohio State University Press, 1989. 
14 ​Thomas Havrilesky and John A. Gildea, “The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting 
Votes: Comment,”  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 23, 1, Ohio State University Press, 1991. 
15 ​Ibid.  
12 
 when inflation is growing rapidly, and that dissents for looser monetary policy are more frequent 
when unemployment is growing rapidly.  In “A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior,” 16
Henry W. Chappell Jr. and Rob Roy McGregor control directly for the growth rate of real GNP 
and the unemployment rate. They find that the coefficient for the GNP is positive, indicating that 
the FOMC raises rates when the economy is growing. They also find that the coefficient on the 
unemployment rate variable is negative, meaning that the FOMC decreases rates when the 
economy is slowing down.  17
 I take a different approach to controlling for the state of the economy, by getting a 
prescription for the federal funds rate from the standard Taylor Rule and a closely related rule 
often referred to as the Yellen Rule.  Then I create a new variable in which I subtract the 
prescription given by the Taylor Rule from the target federal funds rate chosen at the previous 
FOMC meeting. This way, I can determine whether the stance of monetary policy immediately 
prior to an FOMC meeting is tight or loose relative to the current state of the economy, measured 
via the Taylor Rule prescription.  Put another way, a positive value of this variable implies that 
interest rates should be raised (because the prescription for rates is above the prevailing rate), 
while negative values of this variable indicate that, at least according to the Taylor rule, rates 
should be lowered. As described below, a Taylor Rule is a formula that generates a prescription 
for how the FOMC should set interest rates given measures of GDP and inflation. I control for 
the state of the economy indirectly using the Taylor rule, rather than using estimates of real GDP 
and unemployment.  
16 ​Ibid. 
17 ​Henry W. Chappell, Jr. and Rob Roy McGregor, “A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior,” Southern 
Economic Journal, 66, 4, Southern Economic Association, 2000. 
13 
 Using these prescriptions as a benchmark, “tight” policy would be an interest rate setting 
higher than the prescription of the rule and “loose” policy would be an interest rate setting lower 
than the prescription of the rule.  In my second empirical strategy, I regress my dependent 
variable on the difference between the Taylor Rule and the target rate set at the FOMC’s 
previous meeting and the rest of my independent variables (background characteristics and 
political variables). This framework allows me to investigate how background characteristics and 
political leanings of FOMC members impact their voting behavior while controlling for the state 
of the economy, and whether the Taylor Rule would call for an increase or decrease in rates. 
Because my dependent variable has three possibilities (interest rates up, down, or unchanged) I 
use a mulitnomial logit model to relate these three possible choices to the Taylor Rule variable 
and my other independent variables. My work goes beyond Bordo and Istrefi’s paper in this way 
because they do not control for the state of the economy. 
In terms of the effect of education on FOMC voting behavior, Bordo and Istrefi focus on 
the differences between ‘freshwater’ and ‘saltwater’ universities. Freshwater universities include 
the University of Chicago, and other universities that are mostly on bodies of freshwater. 
Saltwater universities include Harvard and MIT, and other universities that are mostly on bodies 
of saltwater. They found that FOMC members with a PhD from freshwater schools are more 
likely to dissent for tighter policy, and that members with a PhD from saltwater schools were 
more balanced.  They also find that compared to FOMC members with PhDs, those with other 
degrees (MBAs, master’s, and bachelor’s) tend to be more hawkish​.  18
 
18 ​Michael Bordo and Klodiana Istrefi, “Perceived FOMC: The Making of Hawks, Doves, and Swingers,” Working 
Paper 24650, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018.  
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 3.   Data Collection  
3.1 Description of Data 
For this project, I created my own original dataset, where each observation is a 
person-meeting. I collected information about the date of each FOMC meeting, the members 
present, their membership status (as the chair, bank president, member of the Board of 
Governors, or alternate member of the FOMC), whether or not they cast a dissent vote, whether a 
dissent vote was made in favor of looser or tighter policy, gender, race, career background, 
educational attainment, party affiliation, donor status, birth year, the year of the degree most 
recently received, the party of the president in office at the time of the meeting, the target federal 
funds rate from the previous meeting, the target federal funds rate decided upon at the current 
meeting, and the rate prescribed by the standard Taylor Rule and the closely related Yellen Rule. 
Most of the aforementioned variables are dummy variables, with the exception of the target 
federal funds rate, Taylor or Yellen Rule Prescription, FOMC member, meeting date, birth year, 
and year of the degree most recently received. There are 5077 observations in my dataset, and 
the FOMC meeting dates range from January 1970 to December 2018.  
I obtained my information on the meeting dates, the FOMC members present, and 
whether or not the member cast a dissent vote from the ​Historical Materials by Year ​webpage of 
the Federal Reserve’s website. I included all meetings during which the target federal funds rate 
was changed, including meetings that were held via conference call and not previously scheduled 
in response to emergencies and sudden developments. For each person-meeting, I had a variable 
called Dissent, TighterDissent, and LooserDissent. The Dissent variable was given a one if the 
FOMC member cast a dissent vote during the meeting and was given a zero otherwise. 
15 
 TighterDissent was given a one if the member dissented in favor of tighter monetary policy, and 
a zero otherwise. LooserDissent was given a one if the member dissented in favor of looser 
monetary policy. Note that if a member did not cast a dissent vote, meaning Dissent was coded 
as zero, that both TighterDissent and LooserDissent received zeros. 
I obtained most of my background information about FOMC members from 
federalreservehistory.org​. For membership status, I had four categories: Chair, BankPresident, 
BoardMember, and AlternateMember. If the FOMC member was the chair, the Chair variable 
received a 1, and a zero otherwise. The other three categories were defined similarly. The 
alternate members are all first vice-presidents of the regional reserve banks who stepped in when 
the bank president could not attend the FOMC meeting.  None of these alternate members cast 
dissent votes.  
I had two categories for gender: Male and Female. Both are dummy variables. If the 
FOMC member was male, the Male variable got a one and the Female variable got a zero. 
Similarly, if the FOMC member was female, the Male variable got a zero and the Female 
variable got a one. I had four categories for race: White, Black, Asian, and MixedRace. All four 
are dummy variables. If the FOMC member was white, the White variable got a one, and a zero 
otherwise. The other three categories were defined similarly. These categories are mutually 
exhaustive. In my regressions, I omit White. 
For work background, I had 6 categories: banking and finance, government, law, 
consulting, research and academia, and non-financial businesses. Note that these categories are 
not mutually exclusive; most FOMC members had worked in more than one of these industries 
before joining the Federal Reserve. For each category, if the FOMC member had worked in the 
16 
 given industry for at least a year, the variable for that category got a one, and a zero otherwise. I 
recorded all of their work experience up to but not including their experience at the Federal 
Reserve. So, if a member of the FOMC worked for a Federal Reserve bank for their entire career, 
they would have a zero in each of the six career categories. Banking and finance includes 
experience at any banks (excluding Federal Reserve banks), financial corporations, and 
insurance companies. Government is a broad category, including experience in state legislatures, 
political advising, campaigning, federal bureaucracy, the White House, and many other jobs 
related to government and politics. Law includes experience with any type of law firm, and 
consulting includes experience with any type of consulting firm. The research and academia 
category includes experience at universities and research firms, including an affiliation with the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Non-financial business includes experience in 
a variety of fields unrelated to finance and banking. Some examples of this in the dataset are 
experience in airlines and agriculture.  
I had four categories for educational attainment: PhD in Economics (or some related 
field, such as Finance), MBA, Law degree, and other advanced degrees. Note that these 
categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, because some FOMC members have multiple 
advanced degrees. For each advanced degree that a FOMC member had, the corresponding 
variable got a one. Otherwise, it got a zero. Other advanced degrees include master's degrees in 
economics, various other master’s degree programs, and bachelors degrees in many fields.  
The most difficult part of compiling this dataset was assigning each FOMC member to a 
party affiliation category: Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Unidentifiable. Each member 
of the Board of Governors was assigned to the category that matched the party affiliation of the 
17 
 president who appointed them. Thus, if a member of the Board of Governors was appointed by a 
Democratic president, that member was classified as a Democrat. Similarly, if a member of the 
Board of Governors was appointed by a Republican president, that member was classified as a 
Republican. The one exception to this rule is that in 2011, President Obama nominated Jeremy 
C. Stein, a Democrat, and Jerome Powell, a Republican, to the Board of Governors as part of a 
bipartisan agreement.  Thus in this case, Stein was classified as a Democrat, and Powell a 19
Republican.  
Classifying bank presidents was a much harder task, because the nomination process for 
bank presidents is far removed from partisan politics. Bank presidents of regional Federal 
Reserve banks are nominated by each bank’s board of directors. I used mostly work experience 
and history of political donations to make these classifications. My first step in classifying bank 
presidents was to check if they had run for political office in the past. If they had, I classified 
them as whichever party they ran as. Only a few of the bank presidents in my dataset had run for 
office. If the member had not run for office, my second step was to investigate the member’s 
work experience for any indications of political leanings. An example of such a job would be if 
the bank president in question was the chair or a member of the Council of Economic Advisors. 
In this case, the party affiliation of the bank president would match that of the sitting President at 
the time, who would have nominated the FOMC member to that position. The same goes for any 
other position appointed by the President of the United States, including the ​Assistant Secretary 
for Economic Policy in the Treasury department.  
19 ​Binyamin Appelbaum, “Obama to Nominate Two for Vacancies on Fed Board,” New York Times, Accessed 24 
April, 2019.  
18 
 If neither of these approaches worked, I checked OpenSecrets, a website that contains 
information about campaign contributions made by individuals, to determine whether or not the 
member had made any political donations. If they had, I assigned them the party affiliation that 
matched the leaning of their donations. Thus, if the bank president had mostly donated to 
Republicans in the past, they were assigned to the Republican category. The criteria for 
determining the leaning of donations is described below.  
If a FOMC member did not fit into the Democrat, Republican, or Independent categories, 
the were placed in the unidentifiable category. Note that because of my criteria for identifying 
party affiliation, all members of the Board of Governors would be either Republicans or 
Democrats. Thus, all FOMC members in the unidentifiable category are bank presidents, though 
not all bank presidents are classified as unidentifiable.  
My information on the donor status of FOMC members came from ​OpenSecrets​. I only 
took into account donations made to candidates running for state or federal office and to state or 
national political parties. If two thirds or more of a member’s donations were made to 
Democrats, then the member was classified as a Democratic donor. Similarly, if two thirds or 
more of a member’s donations were made to Republicans, then the member was classified as a 
Republican donor. If less than two thirds of a member’s donations were made to either party, 
then the member was classified as a mixed donor. In the case that the member had only one 
donation on record, then the member was classified as a donor of the party the donation was 
made to. 
 I did not record any information about the number of donations made, or about the 
magnitude of the donations. When doing a search in OpenSecrets, the user is provided with the 
19 
 type of donation (money to candidates, money to parties, unknown), the name of the person 
making the donation, their city, state, zip code, and occupation at the time of the donation, the 
recipient of the donation (candidate, party, or organization), the date the donation was made, and 
the amount of the donation. Because OpenSecrets does not allow the user to narrow down the 
search results, I had to go through every donation made by someone having the same name as the 
FOMC member, and verify through occupation and location whether or not each search result 
was the FOMC member I was looking for. Once I had decided which donations matched the 
FOMC member, I used the criteria described in the previous paragraph to assign them to a 
donorship category.  
I used this data on campaign contributions in two ways: to augment my party 
identifications and to test whether donations were a stronger measure of political affiliation than 
party identification. As Bordo and Istrefi did in their paper, each Board member was assigned the 
party of the president who appointed them. Bank presidents, however, were much more difficult 
to classify (Bordo and Istrefi did not assign bank presidents party identifications), so I used the 
data from OpenSecrets to assign party identification to bank presidents whose party I was not 
able to identify by other means. Secondly, I chose to collect data on campaign contributions 
because I thought it would be a stronger measure of political leanings, with the logic being that 
people who feel more strongly about politics are more likely to donate to campaigns.  
I also collected the year each FOMC member was born, and which year the member had 
attained their most recent advanced degree. I used the degree year variable to make a series of 
dummy variables that indicated whether or not the member had received their degree in a 
particular decade, from the 1930s up to the 2000s.  
20 
 Additionally, I collected information on the party of the president at the time of each 
FOMC meeting. I had two dummy variables, one indicating that the sitting president was a 
Democrat, and one indicating that the president was a Republican.  
The information about the the Fed’s setting for the federal funds rate came from the ​Open 
Market Operations​ webpage of the Federal Reserve’s website and also from ​thebalance.com.​ For 
each meeting, I recorded the target rate decided upon for that meeting, and the target rate from 
the prior meeting.  I recorded the target rate because sometimes the actual federal funds rate 
deviates a little from the target that the Fed has set for it.  
For every quarter of every year in my dataset, I collected the federal funds rate prescribed 
by the standard Taylor Rule and the Yellen rule.  These rules provide a useful framework for 
thinking about the Fed’s setting of the federal funds rate.  Actual decisions about rates are made 
by a vote by the FOMC and not by a specific rule. That being said, these rules have become a 
standard shorthand or metric among economists for understanding how economic conditions 
may affect Fed decisions about interest rates, and over some periods these types of rules do a 
good job of describing Federal Reserve behavior.  Some economists, most notably the developer 
of these types of rules, John Taylor, have made the normative argument that Federal Reserve 
should​ follow a rule but that remains a controversial position.  In any case, these rules provide a 
useful metric for assessing whether interest rates are above or below the level prescribed by a 
well-known and widely used benchmark; that is, whether, according to these rules, interest rates 
should be increased, decreased, or left unchanged. 
The prescriptions for the federal funds rate from these Rules came from a tool on the 
Atlanta Fed’s​ website.  On page 21 is the equation for the Standard Rule, where i​t​ is the federal 
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 funds rate prescribed by the rule, 2 is the neutral real rate of interest, (𝜋 ​t​ - 𝜋 ​*​) is the gap between 
current inflation and the Fed’s target for inflation, and (Y​t ​- Y​*​) is the output gap (the difference 
between actual real GDP and potential or trend GDP expressed in percent terms).  The 
coefficients of 0.5 on the inflation gap and output gap reflect weights identified by John Taylor 
to indicate the importance of each of those factors on the Fed’s setting of interest rates. The only 
difference for the Yellen Rule is that the weight on the GDP gap is 1 instead of 0.5; that is, the 
Yellen Rule puts more weight on deviations of real GDP from its trend than does the Standard 
Rule indicating that, for example, the Fed would lower interest rates more aggressively in 
response to a recession. 
For my inflation measure, I chose Core PCE inflation, which is a measure of inflation 
that excludes inflation in food and energy. For my output gap measure, I chose a measure of the 
GDP gap calculated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). In a perfect world, I would have 
used “real-time” data both for the inflation measure and for the GDP gap, where real-time data 
reflect values of variables as they were published and would have been seen by decision makers 
at the time of each FOMC meeting.  Because economic data can be revised substantially over 
time, real-time data can be quite different than currently published values of variables like GDP. 
However, I did not use real time data because it was only available for 1990 and after, meaning 
that I would not be able to use the data I collected for the 1970s and 1980s.  It would be 
interesting to explore whether the use of real-time data would make a difference to results over 
the period for which it is available.  
The formula for the standard Taylor Rule and Yellen Rule are, respectively: 
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 i​t​ = 2 + 𝜋 ​t​ + 0.5(𝜋 ​t​ - 𝜋 ​*​) + 0.5(Y​t ​- Y​*​) 
i​t​ = 2 + 𝜋 ​t​ + 0.5(𝜋 ​t​ - 𝜋 ​*​) + (Y​t ​- Y​*​) 
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics for the variables are displayed in Table 1 of Section 8. For each 
variable, we have the number of observations for which we have information about, the mean, 
standard deviation, and maximum and minimum values. We can see from the table that about 6.6 
percent of the observations were dissent votes. 1.9 percent of the observations are dissents for 
looser monetary policy, and 4.1 percent are dissents for tighter monetary policy. 0.6 percent of 
the total observations are dissents made for other reasons, such as disagreement about the 
wording of the statement released with the FOMC policy decision. However, these dissents are 
not included in my analysis.  
Recall that each observation is a member vote at a particular meeting. Pertaining to 
membership status, 9.1 percent of the observations are votes by chairs, 44.8 percent are bank 
presidents, 45.7 percent are board members, and 0.6 percent are alternate members. For the 
gender categories, 88.5 percent of the observations are male, and 11.5 percent are female. 95.5 
percent of the observations are white, 4.1 percent are black, 0.2 percent are Asian, and 0.3 
percent mixed race.  Clearly, the Federal Reserve has a diversity problem to fix. 20
Regarding career background, 38.2 percent of the observations have experience in 
finance or banking, 42.7 percent in government, 7.5 percent in law firms, 6.2 percent in 
consulting, 50.9 percent in academia and research, and 3.0 percent in non-financial business. In 
20 These percentages do not add up to 100.0% due to rounding. 
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 the educational attainment category, 58.3 percent have a PhD in economics or some related field, 
16.4 percent have a MBA, 11.8 percent have a law degree, and 18.3 percent have other advanced 
degrees.  
In the political affiliation category, 46.0 percent of the observations are Republican, 33.8 
percent are Democrat, 1.2 percent are Independent, and 19.0 percent are unidentifiable. For 
campaign contributions, 47.8 percent of the observations made a donation to a political party or 
campaign. 22.2 percent of the observations were Republican donors, 24.7 percent were 
Democratic donors, and 0.8 percent were mixed donors, meaning they made donations to both 
Republicans and Democrats, but did not lean toward either party.  
For birth year, the minimum value was 1904 and the maximum value was 1973. The 
mean value was 1934.3. (Remember, my dataset begins in 1970.)  For degree year, the minimum 








 4.    Empirical Strategies 
4.1 Strategy #1: Regressions on Dissent Variables 
I have two main empirical strategies for this project. The first is a linear probability 
model that regresses whether or not an FOMC member cast a dissent vote on the member’s 
background characteristics. These characteristics include their membership status, work 
experience, educational attainment, race, gender, political affiliation, donorship status, the 
decade in which they received their most recent degree, and the party of the President in office at 
the time. I ran each regression three times for each of my three dependent variables: whether or 
not an FOMC member cast a dissent vote (Dissent) coded 1 for a dissent vote and 0 otherwise, a 
dissent vote for tighter monetary policy (TighterDissent), or a dissent vote for looser monetary 
policy (LooserDissent). Another important note is that I ran regressions with political affiliation 
and donorship status separately due to high correlation between the two variables. I also included 
a time fixed effect to control for variation explained by variation in time.  
Below is a description of the regression. All of the categories below represent each 
dummy variable falling under it, with one omitted to avoid collinearity issues.  For example, 
 represents all the career categories, banking and finance, law, consulting, academia CareersB 2  
and research, and non-financial business (i.e. all the variables in that category, except the one 
that is omitted). The government category is omitted for careers. The i.Year term represents the 
time fixed effect.  
 
issent B  B BankP resident B Careers B Education  B Gender  B Race D =  0 +  1 +  2 +  3 +  4 +  5 +   
B P artyAf f iliation  B P residentP arty  B DegreeDecade  B i.Y ear ε  6 +  7 +  8 +  9 +  i  
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 One important note about this strategy is that the coefficients represent correlations 
between FOMC member background characteristics and the probability of casting a dissent vote. 
These estimates are not causal. One of the reasons why this estimate is not causal is because in 
this strategy, I have neglected to control for the state of the economy.  
 
4.2 Strategy #2: Regressions on Vote Direction Variables, Controlling for State of Economy 
In my second empirical strategy, I control for the state of the economy and its possible 
effect on interest rate decisions using estimates of the standard Taylor Rule and the Yellen Rule. 
As noted, a Taylor Rule is a formula that generates a prescription for how the FOMC should set 
interest rates given measures of GDP and inflation. Then I create a new variable (called 
RuleMinusRate and YellenRuleMinusRate, respectively) in which I subtract the target federal 
funds rate chosen at the previous FOMC meeting from the prescription given by both Taylor 
Rules. This way, I can benchmark for policy prescribed by the Taylor Rule as above or below the 
federal funds rate that prevailed since the previous meeting.  If the Taylor Rule prescription is 
above the federal funds rate prevailing before the meeting, then policy should be tighter 
(according to the Taylor Rule).  Conversely, if the Taylor Rule prescription is below the 
prevailing federal funds rate, then policy should be looser.  
I also created two dummy variables to identify differential effects of the rules in different 
time periods. To do this, I created a dummy variable that was coded 1 for observations in the 
time period 1980 - 2008 and 0 otherwise, and another variable coded 1 for 2008 - 2018 and 0 
otherwise. My first time period for the 1970s (which will now be captured by the RuleMinusRate 
variable) included all FOMC meetings taking place between the first quarter of 1971 and the 
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 fourth quarter of 1979. My second time period from 1980 to 2008 included all FOMC meetings 
between the first quarter of 1980 and the second quarter of 2008. The third period from 2008 to 
2018 included all meetings between the third quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2018. The 
resulting variables, in addition to the RuleMinusRate variables, are called Std1980t2008 and 
Std2008t2018 for the Standard Taylor Rule.  For the Yellen rule, they are Yellen1980t2008, and 
Yellen2008t2018.  
My reasoning for splitting up the time periods this way is as follows. John Taylor, who 
developed the Taylor Rule, has argued that the Fed was not behaving in line with the Rule until 
the mid 1980s.   In addition, monetary policy underwent a significant change in 1979 under 21
Chair Paul Volcker.  Accordingly, I decided to end this period in the second quarter of 1980. 
For the next period, I decided to end in the second quarter of 2008 just ahead of the most intense 
part of the financial crisis. This is because once the economy started to go downhill, the 
prescriptions that the Taylor and Yellen Rules gave were negative. The federal funds rate did 
not, in fact, go negative, and it was no longer an effective policy tool once it was at zero. As a 
result, the Federal Reserve was forced to enact unconventional monetary policy, such as 
quantitative easing, during the 2008 financial crisis, and was not using the Taylor Rule as a 
gauge of how the economy was doing and what that would imply for the setting of interest rates. 
More recently, the federal funds rate has consistently been below the standard Taylor Rule 
prescription.  
As a result of splitting the Taylor Rule prescriptions up into three time periods, I am able 
to examine whether the rules had different effects in different time periods. I expect that the 
21 ​Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler, “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 2, 1999. 
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 effect of the Taylor Rule variables in the first period mostly covering the 1970s (captured by my 
un-interacted RuleMinusRate variables) will be insignificant since the Fed was not particularly 
paying attention to the Taylor Rule during this period.  I expect that the variables for the 1980 to 
2008 time period will be significant because we know during this period that the Federal Reserve 
was paying attention to the Taylor Rule. In Figure 1, we can see that the federal funds rate 
predicted by the Taylor and Yellen Rules, and the actual federal funds have similar trends. I 
expect that the variables for the 2008 to 2018 time period will not be significant because during 
the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve was not able to use conventional monetary policy. 
Therefore, the federal funds rate, which did not go below zero, was not following the trend of the 
rate predicted by the rule, which were negative. In years after the crisis, during the recovery, the 
federal funds rate has been consistently below the rate predicted by the standard Taylor Rule. 
In the second empirical strategy, I use different dependent variables than the ones in my 
first empirical strategy. My dependent variable now takes on three values captured by an index 
variable with values 1, 2, and 3 capturing VoteUnchanged, VoteIncrease, and VoteDecrease. The 
index got a 1 (VoteUnchanged) if the FOMC member voted to leave the rate unchanged at a 
particular meeting and a zero otherwise. The index got a 2 (VoteIncrease) if the FOMC member 
voted to increase the target rate, and a zero otherwise. Finally, the index got a 3 (VoteDecrease) 
if the FOMC member voted to decrease the rate and a zero otherwise.  
The thought process for the assignment of values to the index is shown in Table 2. For 
example, if the FFRTargetChange  was equal to 1, and the FOMC member cast a dissent for 22
looser policy, then the index was assigned 1. The reasoning here is that if FFRTargetChange is 1, 
22 ​A value of one for FFRTargetChange indicates that the FOMC voted to increase the rate, relative to the previous 
meeting. A zero indicates that the FOMC voted to keep the rate the same, relative to the previous meeting. A 
negative one indicates that the FOMC voted to decrease the rate, relative to the previous meeting. 
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 the rate at the current FOMC meeting proposed by the majority is higher than the target rate at 
the previous meeting. In this situation, if a member dissented in favor of looser policy, they want 
the rate to be lower, indicating their preference to not change the target rate from the previous 
meeting. Thus the index would be get a one, because the FOMC member effectively voted not to 
change the rate through their dissent for looser policy. 
Having defined these variables, I regress my dependent variable on the difference 
between the Taylor Rule and the previously set federal funds rate, the Taylor Rule variables for 
the 1980 to 2008 and 2008 to 2018 time periods, and the rest of my independent variables 
(background characteristics and political variables). This framework allows me to investigate 
how background characteristics and political leanings of FOMC members impact their voting 
behavior while controlling for the state of the economy. Because I have a dependent variable 
with three possible choices, I use a multinomial logit to estimate my results. Multinomial logit 
takes one of the categories, VoteUnchanged (index value of 1), and makes it the ‘reference 
category.’ It then effectively calculates separate regressions for VoteIncrease and VoteDecrease, 
relative to the reference category while making sure that the implied probabilities of choosing 
each of the three choices sum to one. Therefore, I only examine the signs and statistical 
significance of the coefficients for choices to increase or decrease rates relative to the reference 
category of leaving rates unchanged. 
I also clustered the standard errors by FOMC member because I expected that the error 
terms would be correlated for each member. The reasoning here is that each member brings their 
own philosophy about voting in FOMC meetings. In particular, I noticed when I was making my 
dataset that there were people who cast dissent votes often, and always in the same direction. For 
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 example, Martha Seger, a member of the Board of Governors from 1984 to 1991, dissented for 
looser monetary policy 18 times out of the 55 total FOMC meetings that she attended. Thus, 
Seger cast a dissent vote for about a third of the total meetings she attended. Susan Phillips, a 
member of the Board of Governors from 1991 to 1998, attended 52 FOMC meetings, and cast 0 
dissent votes.  To put these numbers into context, dissent votes are only six percent of the 
observations of my dataset. Thus, it appears that each FOMC member may have a consistent 
pattern in their voting that could cause the standard errors to be correlated for each member.  
The description of my regressions for this strategy is below. I included my 
RuleMinusRate, and time period Taylor Rules, and political party variables (Republican, 
Democrat, and neither) in each regression. I omitted the 1970s Taylor Rule variable, and my 
Democrat variable.  I also included some interaction terms.  First, I included an interaction term 
between the RuleMinusRate variable and Republican party identification to see if Republicans 
respond to the state of the economy as expressed by the Taylor Rule differently than do 
Democrats or those without a party identification. Second, I included an interaction term 
between the RuleMinusRate variable and the party of the President. The idea here is to see if 
FOMC members respond differently to the signal from the Taylor Rule depending on the party 
of the President. Third, I included interaction terms between the party of each FOMC member 
and the party of the President. The question here is whether any partisanship appears in terms of 
how FOMC members vote depending on whether the President is or is not from their party. 
Thus, I include dummy variables for Republican FOMC members when the President is a 
Democrat, for Democratic members when the President is a Republican, and for when the 
member is neither a Democrat or Republican when the President is a Republican.  
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  I ran a separate regression for each set of background characteristics that I wanted to test: 
gender, race, career background, educational attainment, and the decade in which each FOMC 
member received their most recent degree.  (I report some but not all of these results below.) 
 Additionally, I ran some regressions with my political donor variables, omitting 
DemocratDonor. I also included interactive variables in these regressions parallel to those 
described above for party affiliation.  My political party variables were not included in these 
regressions due to high correlation between these variables. 
 Note that in the multinomial logit setup, the coefficients on each independent variable 
can differ for each value of the dependent variable.    All told, my specification is:  
 
VoteUnchanged, VoteIncrease, VoteDecrease = B​0 ​+ B​1​RuleMinusRate + B​2​Std1980t2008​i​+ 
B​3​Std2008t2018 + B​4​RuleMinusRate*PartyAffiliation + B​5​RuleMinusRate*PartyOfPresident + 





 5. Analysis and Results 
5.1 Basic Dissent Regressions: Correlation Between Background Characteristics and the 
Probability of Dissent Voting (Table 3) 
Using a linear probability model, I investigate the impact of all my background 
characteristics (career, educational attainment, gender, race, political affiliation, partisan leaning 
of donations, the party of the sitting president, membership status (Board member or Bank 
President), and the decade in which most recent degree was attained) on my dissent dependent 
variables (Dissent, LooserDissent, and TighterDissent). Thus, I estimate three regressions, one 
for each of the dissent variables, with each regression including time fixed effects. However, in 
this set of regressions, I do not control for the state of the economy. These estimates are 
correlations between certain background characteristics and the probability of casting a dissent 
vote; they are not causal. My omitted categories (to avoid perfect collinearity) for these variables 
are government, all other degrees, female, white, Democratic party affiliation, Democratic donor, 
Democratic President, Board member, and final degree received in 1990s or 2000s. 
The variable identifying Bank presidents is significant at the 5 percent level in all three 
linear probability models. In the Dissent regression, the coefficient of BankPresident is 0.057, 
which means that bank presidents are 5.7 percentage points more likely to cast a dissent vote, 
relative to Board members. For LooserDissent, the coefficient on BankPresident is -0.014. This 
means that Bank presidents are 1.4 percentage points less likely to cast a dissent for looser 
policy, relative to Board members. The coefficient for BankPresident in the TighterDissent 
regression is 0.061, which means that bank presidents are 6.1 percentage points more likely to 
32 
 dissent for tighter policy, relative to Board members. Taken together, these results indicate that 
bank presidents are hawkish, a result consistent with prior literature. 
The variable identifying members as Republicans is significant at the 5 percent level in 
all three linear probability models. In the Dissent regression, the coefficient of Republican is 
0.032, which means that Republicans are 3.2 percentage points more likely to cast a dissent vote 
than Democrats. For LooserDissent, the coefficient of Republican is 0.014, which means that 
Republicans are 1.4 percentage points more likely to cast a dissent for looser policy, compared to 
Democrats. This is not what we would expect, given that the prior literature tells us that 
Republicans are hawkish. One possible reason for this unexpected result is that I did not control 
for the state of the economy in this regression. The coefficient of Republican in the 
TighterDissent regression is 0.027, which means that Republicans are 2.7 percentage points more 
likely to cast a dissent for tighter policy, compared to Democrats. Taken together, these results 
are mixed as they tell us that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to dissent for looser 
and for tighter policy. 
I find that members classified as Independents are hawkish compared to Democrats. In 
the Dissent regression, the coefficient for Independent is 0.192, which means that Independents 
are 19.2 percentage points more likely to cast a dissent vote than Democrats. For TighterDissent, 
the coefficient for Independent is 0.184, which means that Independents are 18.4 percentage 
points more likely to cast a dissent vote for tighter policy than Democrats. Only one FOMC 
member (Thomas Hoenig) is classified as an Independent, and he attended a total of 61 FOMC 
meetings.  Accordingly, these results are picking up on his voting behavior in particular as there 
is no member fixed effect in this regression.  (The member fixed effect includes a fixed effect for 
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 each FOMC member.) The Independent variable is essentially a dummy variable for Hoenig, and 
the results indicate that he is hawkish. 
I find that FOMC members classified as unidentifiable are dovish compared to 
Democrats. In the LooserDissent regression, the coefficient of Unidentifiable is 0.015, which 
means that FOMC members classified as Unidentifiable are 1.5 percentage points more likely to 
dissent for looser policy. This is a surprising result given that nearly all the Unidentifiable 
observations are Bank presidents. No board members are classified as Unidentifiable because 
each board member was assigned the political affiliation of the President who appointed them. 
The prior literature tells us that bank presidents are hawkish, so we would expect FOMC 
members classified as Unidentifiable to be hawkish. These results suggest that they are dovish. 
More work will be needed to sort out exactly what is going on with FOMC members with no 
identifiable party affiliation. 
For our Male variable, in the Dissent regression, the coefficient of Male is -0.046, which 
means that men are 4.6 percentage points less likely to cast a dissent vote, relative to women. For 
LooserDissent, the coefficient of Male is -0.046, which means that men are 4.6 percentage points 
less likely to cast a dissent vote for looser policy, relative to women.  The coefficient on Male in 
the TighterDissent regression is insignificant.  Taken together, these results indicate that male 




 5.2 Impact of Political Affiliation on FOMC Voting Behavior After Controlling for the State 
of the Economy (Yellen Rule): Tables 4a and 4b 
In this section, I use the multinomial logit model to  investigate the impact of political 
affiliation on FOMC voting behavior while controlling for the state of the economy via the 
Yellen Rule mechanism. I cluster standard errors by member. 
For the multinomial logit estimates that compare VoteIncrease to VoteUnchanged, the 
coefficient on my YellenRuleMinusRate variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level.  (See the first column of table 4a for parameter estimates.)  This means that the FOMC 
member is more likely to vote to increase the federal funds rate when the Yellen Rule indicates 
that they should.  (Because I also interact this variable with dummy variables specifically 
identifying later time spans of the sample, these results indicate the effect for the period from 
1971 to 1979.)  The coefficient on the Yellen1980t2008 variable is positive and significant at the 
5 percent level. This means that during the 1980 to 2008 time period, FOMC members were 
more likely to vote to increase the rate when the Yellen Rule indicated that they should than they 
were during the earlier period.  These results make sense because the Federal Reserve was, 
according to the literature, not particularly following the behavior prescribed by Taylor-like rules 
in that earlier period.  The sign on the Yellen2008t2018 variable also is positive and significant, 
indicating that economic conditions were even more important for rate-setting decisions during 
this period during and after the financial crisis than they were in the earlier periods. 
The coefficient on the variable interacting the Yellen Rule with Republican party 
affiliation (YellenRebublican)  is insignificant, while the variable interacting the Yellen Rule 
with the a variable indicating that the President is a Republican is negative and significant.  This 
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 result indicates that, during Republican Administrations, FOMC members paid less attention to 
economic conditions as captured by the Yellen Rule when considering rate increases than they 
did during Democratic Administrations. 
The coefficient on BankPresident is positive but insignificant, and is relative to 
BoardMember, which is omitted from this regression. This is an interesting find because in the 
regressions from the first empirical strategy, BankPresident was one of the few variables that 
was consistently statistically significant. Prior literature also finds that bank presidents are more 
likely to be hawkish, so it is surprising that this coefficient is not significant.  Apparently, once 
the analysis controls for the effects of the economy, Bank Presidents are no more hawkish (likely 
to vote to increase rates) than are Board members. 
For my political affiliation variables, I have omitted the Democrat category, so all the 
results are relative to Democrats. The coefficient on my Republican variable is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level, implying that FOMC members who are Republican are more 
likely to vote to increase the rate, and therefore are more hawkish than Democrats. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this result does not hold during Democratic Administrations.  (As noted below, 
however, the magnitudes of these effects on the probability of Republicans voting for rate 
increases are quite small.)  Results for Democrats are more interesting.  During Republican 
Administrations, Democratic FOMC members are more likely to vote for rate increases than they 
are during Democratic Administrations.  (Coefficient on Democrat w/Republican President is 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level.)  For FOMC members whom I could identify 
neither as a Democrat or a Republican, coefficients are insignificant, both during Democratic and 
Republican Administrations. 
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 I also obtained estimates for a linearized version of my model to gauge the effect of  a 
unit change in each independent variable on voting probabilities.  Doing this is necessary 
because the multinomial logit model is highly nonlinear so the coefficient estimates associated 
with each variable do not indicate the marginal effect of that variable on voting probabilities as 
would be the case in a linear probability model.  (I did this with the margins command and dy/dx 
option in Stata.) These results are reported in the dy/dx columns of the tables. The coefficient for 
YellenRuleMinusRate is 0.014, which means that when the Yellen Rule indicates that the federal 
funds rate should be raised by 1 percentage point, FOMC members were about 1.4 percentage 
points more likely to vote to increase the rate than would be the case if the Yellen Rule 
prescribed no change in the federal funds rate. This coefficient was significant at the 5 percent 
level. The coefficient for Yellen1980t2008 is 0.058 and significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, 
during meetings occurring from 1980 to 2008, FOMC members were 7.2 percentage points more 
likely to raise the rate when the Yellen Rule indicated that they should rates by 1 percentage 
point.  (This is the sum of the marginal effects from the YellenRuleMinusRate coefficient and 
the Yellen1980t2008 coefficient). The coefficient for Yellen2008t2018 also was positive and 
significant.  Thus, during this period, FOMC members were 13.8 percentage points more likely 
to raise rates when the Yellen Rule said they should raise rates 1 percentage point than when the 
Yellen Rule called for no change in rates. 
For the terms interacting the Yellen Rule with Republican party identification of FOMC 
members and Republican Administrations, Republican party identification has virtually no effect 
on voting probabilities, while the Republican Administration interaction coefficient indicates that 
FOMC members downweight the signal from the Yellen Rule by an amount generating a 2.3 
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 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of raising rates when a Republican in President and 
the Yellen Rule says raise rates by 1 percentage point.  Apparently, economic conditions play a 
larger role for FOMC members during Democratic Administrations.  Digging deeper into the 
source of this result is a top priority for future research. 
Of the remaining variables, the only coefficient that was significant in the multinomial 
logit and that has a decent-sized marginal effect is for the variable identifying Democratic 
FOMC members during Republican Administrations (Democrat w/Republican Pres).  The 
marginal effect indicates a 5.3 percentage point higher probability of voting for a rate increase 
during Republican Administrations than during Democratic Administrations.  Perhaps 
Democrats are more hawkish during Republican Administrations. It is important to point out, 
however, that the marginal effect in the linearized model is not significant, even though the 
corresponding coefficient in the multinomial logit is significant.  Both the multinomial logit 
coefficient and the calculation of marginal effects are calculated with non-linear optimization 
routines and, interestingly, one delivers a significant result while the other does not. 
For the multinomial logit estimates that compare VoteDecrease to VoteUnchanged (table 
4b), the coefficient on my YellenRuleMinusRate variable is not significant, indicating that in the 
earlier time period from 1971 to 1979, economic conditions as captured by the Yellen Rule did 
not appear to have an effect on monetary policy. The coefficient on the Yellen1980t2008 
variable is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. This means that during the 1980 to 
2008 time period, FOMC members were more likely to vote to decrease the rate when the Yellen 
Rule indicated that they should, relative to the earlier time period.  (A negative coefficient 
estimate implies a higher probability because the YellenRuleMinusRate variable is negative 
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 when the rule prescribes a decrease in the federal funds rate.) The coefficient on the 
Yellen2008t2018 variable is negative and significant at the five percent level. This means that 
during the 2008 to 2018 time period, FOMC members were more likely to vote to decrease the 
rate when the Yellen Rule indicated that they should than they were during the 1970s. This result 
is capturing the persistent decreases in the federal funds rate (as would have been prescribed by 
the Yellen Rule) during this time period. 
The coefficient on the term interacting the Yellen Rule with Republican party 
identification is insignificant, while the coefficient on the term interacting the Yellen Rule with a 
Republican Administration is positive and significant.  This estimate indicates that during 
Republican Administrations, FOMC members place less weight on a signal from the Yellen Rule 
to reduce rates than they do during Democratic Administrations.  (The value of the Yellen Rule 
variable (RuleMinusRate) is negative when it is calling for a decrease in rates.  This negative 
value multiplied by  the positive coefficient implies a smaller probability of decreasing rates.) 
Here too, the coefficient on BankPresident was insignificant, in contrast to prior literature 
indicating that Bank Presidents tend to be more hawkish (less likely to vote to decrease rates). 
The coefficient for Republican is positive and significant, while the coefficient on the variable 
identifying Republicans during Democratic Administrations (Republican w/Democratic Pres) is 
negative and significant. Coefficients on the other interactive variables between party 
identification of each FOMC member and the party of the President at the time indicate a greater 
likelihood that Democrats vote for rate decreases during Republican Administrations than during 
Democratic Administrations.  As well, those FOMC members whose party was not identified 
also are more likely to vote to decrease rates during Republican Administrations than during 
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 Democratic Administrations.  Taken together, these results could reflect some complicated 
pattern of partisanship in FOMC voting patterns or, alternatively, it could reflect some other 
difference between Republican and Democratic Administrations that is not captured by any other 
variable in the model. 
As above, I also obtained linearized estimates to gauge the effect of a unit increase in 
each of the independent variables on the probabilities of the dependent variables. The coefficient 
for YellenRuleMinusRate is insignificant.  For Yellen1980t2008, the coefficient is -0.075 and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. This means that during the 1980 to 2008 period, FOMC 
members were 6.7 percentage points more likely to vote to decrease the rate when the Yellen 
Rule indicated they should lower rates by 1 percentage point (.067 = -.075 + .008) than was the 
case during the 1970s. The coefficient on Yellen2008t2018 is -0.083 and is significant at the 5 
percent level. This means that during the 2008 to 2018 period, FOMC members were 7.5 
percentage points more likely to vote to decrease the rate when the Yellen Rule indicated they 
should drop the rate by 1 percentage point (-.075= -.083 +. 008).  For the terms interacting the 
Yellen Rule with party variables, we see that during Republican Administrations, FOMC 
members are 2.8 (=.020+.008) less likely to decrease rates when the Yellen Rule says they 
should reduce rates by 1 percentage point than if the Rule suggested no change in rates. 
The coefficient on BankPresident is insignificant at the 5 percent level; again, no effect of 
being a Bank President as compared to a Board Member in contradiction to the prior literature. 
For political affiliation, the coefficient on Republican is positive and insignificant, indicating that 
Republicans are 21.9 percentage points more likely to vote for a rate decrease than are 
Democrats.  However, this effect disappears when the President is a Democrat.  Similarly, 
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 Democrats are 20.4 percentage points more likely to vote for a decrease in rates when the 
President is a Republican, while FOMC members that were identified as neither Democrat nor 
Republicans also are more likely to vote a rate decrease when the President is a Republican. 
These results mirror those described above where the consequential partisan difference seems to 
depend more on the party of the President than the party of FOMC members.  As noted, this 
warrants further investigation to sort out if it reflects a particular pattern of partisan behavior or 
some other factor not captured in the model. 
  
5.3 Impact of Gender and Educational Background on FOMC Voting Behavior After 
Controlling for the State of the Economy (Yellen Rule): Tables 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b 
Prior literature has considered the role of other demographic variables.  In tables 5a and 
5b I repeat the above specifications with a dummy variable for male added, while in tables 6a 
and 6b I add variables for educational background (whether an FOMC member received a PhD, 
an MBA, a law degree, or any other degree (omitted category)). Somewhat to my surprise, none 
of these variables are significant in any of the specifications, and the pattern of other coefficients 
is relatively little affected.  Thus, I do not describe these results in detail, though I note that the 
insignificance of the coefficient on male in these specifications contrasts with what I found in my 
first empirical strategy. Apparently, once the state of the economy and the various identifications 
of political party, the voting pattern of FOMC members does not vary systematically based on 
their gender or educational background.  
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 5.4 Impact of Donor Partisanship on FOMC Voting Behavior While Controlling for the State 
of the Economy (Yellen Rule): Tables 7a and 7b 
 As noted, one of my motivations at the beginning of this project was to investigate 
whether the intensity of partisanship matters for FOMC voting behavior.  To recap, my 
conjecture is that FOMC member who have made political donations will be more intensely 
partisan than those from the same party who did not make donations.  To roughly gauge whether 
there is anything to this idea, I reran the multinomial logit models described in tables 4a and 4b 
but with the variable identifying donor status rather than party identification.  These results are 
reported in tables 7a and 7b. 
For the most part, these results with donor status are not substantially different than those 
reported in tables 4a and 4b with party identification.  In a handful of cases, the marginal effects 
are a bit larger with the donor variables than with party identification variables but the 
differences are not great.  For example, Democratic donors with a Republican President are 7.8 
percentage points more likely to vote for a rate increase than they are with a Democratic 
President, and the result is statistically significant.  Similarly, the mixed donor marginal effect is 
positive, large (15.1 percentage points), and significant.  Because there are no mixed donors who 
are FOMC members when a Democrat is President, this effect identifies the impact on voting 
behavior of an FOMC member being a mixed donor when a Republican is President. The 
comparable coefficient with the party identification for Republican FOMC members when a 
Republican is President is smaller and insignificant.  Interestingly, this provides further evidence 
that the key difference in behavior seems to occur when Republicans are President compared 
with when Democrats are President.  More generally, the outcome that there is not so much 
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 difference between the results using party identification and those using donor status is not so 
surprising given the partial overlap between my party identification and donor status variables 
(as discussed in more detail below in the section on limitations). 
  
5.5 Impact of Political Affiliation on FOMC Voting Behavior Using the  Standard Taylor Rule 
to Control for the State of the Economy: Tables 4a through 7b 
Economists have considered many versions of Taylor-like Rules that provide 
prescriptions for the federal funds rate based on variables capturing the state of the economy. 
Based on my read of the literature, I believe that the Yellen Rule is more appropriate in my 
setup.  That being said, I also re-estimated all of the multinomial logit models using prescriptions 
for the federal funds rate using the Standard Taylor Rule, which puts less weight on economic 
activity (whether GDP is above or below its trend) than does the Yellen Rule.  Just as for the 
models using the Yellen Rule, I cluster standard errors by member.  Results for these regressions 
are reported in columns 3 and 4 (labeled with the column head “standard” for standard Taylor 
Rule) in tables 4a through 7b. 
Focusing on marginal effects of independent variables, in the multinomial logit results 
comparing an VoteIncrease to VoteUnchanged, the pattern of coefficient on the RuleMinusRate 
variables are quite different than when the Yellen Rule is used.  For the coefficient describing the 
1970s, the marginal effect implies that when the Standard Taylor Rule prescribes a 1 percentage 
point increase in rates, FOMC members are 2.3 percentage point ​less ​likely to increase rates than 
if the Taylor Rule had called for no change in rates (and the estimate is significant).  This is a 
strange result and likely highlights the degree to which FOMC members were not following the 
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 Taylor Rule in this period.  In the period from 1980 to 2008, the coefficient switches to the 
“correct” positive sign and is significant.  Then in the period from 2008 to 2018 during the 
financial crisis, the coefficient switches back to being negative and significant, suggesting that 
policymakers were not following the standard Taylor Rule in this period either. Indeed, my 
results for the Yellen Rule suggest that policy decisions came closer to those called for by the 
Yellen Rule, which puts more weight on the deviation of real GDP from its trend.  For the 
variables capturing partisanship, the signs and patterns of significance are fairly similar across 
the specifications using the Yellen and Standard Taylor Rules to control for economic 
conditions. 
For the multinomial logit results comparing VoteIncrease to VoteUnchanged, the pattern 
of coefficients and significance is very similar whether the Yellen or Standard versions of the 
Taylor Rule are used to control for the effects of economic conditions.  (For example, compare 
columns 2 and 4 in table 4b.)  This similarity extends both to the coefficients on the 
RuleMinusRate variables and those on the partisanship variables.  
  
5.6 Description of Other Regressions Tried 
 I also considered the impact of race, career, and the decade in which the FOMC member 
received their most recent degree on FOMC voting behavior. I did these earlier on in my 
research in a different specification than those reported here.  In those regressions, I did not find 
much of interest.  For my race variable, there are very few observations for non-white FOMC 
members and also race is not always observable, making it difficult to compile accurate data. 
The results from my career regressions were difficult to interpret, which could possibly be due to 
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 definition issues. I split career into six broad categories (banking/finance, government, law, 
consulting, academia/research, and non-financial business) that may not have been narrow 
enough to provide accurate results.  I intend to experiment further with these variables to verify 




















 VI. Limitations of My Results and Directions for Future Work 
 The first limitation of my results is that my political affiliation and partisan donor 
variables are highly correlated due to the way that I defined them. On the hand, this outcome is 
not surprising.  On the other hand, it indicates that my political affiliation variables and partisan 
donor variables may not be providing so much independent information. I had said that if a 
FOMC had not run for office in the past or had a job indicating political leanings, my third 
strategy for identifying political affiliation was to check if they had made any donations to 
partisan campaigns. If they leaned Democrat with their donations, then I assigned them as a 
Democrat for their party affiliation. I did not keep track of how often this was the case, but it did 
happen frequently. I had chosen to collect information on donations because I thought it would 
be a stronger measure of political leanings, owing to the fact that people who donate to 
campaigns probably feel more strongly about politics than those who do not. 
I also had used the information on campaign contributions as a way to increase the 
number of FOMC members whom I could assign a party identification to. Bordo and Istrefi used 
the same strategy that I did with Board members, by assigning them the same party identification 
as the President who appointed them. However, Bordo and Istrefi did not assign party 
identification to bank presidents. Using the campaign contribution data was a way for me to 
determine the political orientation of many bank presidents. However, this means that there is a 
lot of overlap between my party and donor variables. In the future, I would dig more deeply into 
this problem to see if donations do say anything about the intensity of partisanship by running 
two regressions (one with party variables and one with donor variables) restricted to just Board 
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 members (whose party identification was independent of the donor data). Then I would be able 
to see which set of variables matters more for intensity of partisanship. 
 My variables for career were also loosely defined. The six categories were 
banking/finance, government, law, consulting, academia/research, and non-financial business. 
Government was probably the most broad category. I assigned anyone to it who had any 
involvement in politics or government. If a FOMC member run for state legislature, did political 
advising for the White House, worked for a legislator, was a member of the Council of Economic 
Advisors, or did any other related job, he or she was placed in the Government category. Given 
the general insignificance of the coefficients on these variables, those categories are, apparently, 
not narrow enough to give interesting, accurate results. 
 There are also many interesting directions for future work. One direction for future work 
would be to repeat some of the regressions I did in my second empirical strategy with different 
versions of the Taylor Rule. Another interesting direction would be to get real time data for the 
Taylor Rule prescriptions.  Real-time data refers to the vintage of data that policymakers would 
have seen at the time they were making decisions.  Because real GDP data are revised, today’s 
estimates for real GDP in, say, 1982, could be quite different from the estimates that would have 
been available in 1982.  Using real-time data would give more accurate results because we would 
be looking at the same data as the FOMC members were when they were making their decisions 
about the federal funds rate. However, I did not use real time data because it was only available 
after 1990, and did not cover my entire dataset.  I intend to try this in future research. I also could 
have tried multinomial probit rather than multinomial logit to see if my results are sensitive to 
differences in functional form. 
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 VII. Conclusion 
The most interesting and clearest conclusion that FOMC voting behavior is different 
when a Republican is President than when a Democrat is President.  These differences across 
Administrations are particularly pronounced for decisions to decrease rates though they also 
seem to play a role in decisions to increase rates (though not as strongly).   I had expected to find 
that Republican FOMC members are more hawkish than Democratic FOMC members, but I did 
not find that as a consistent pattern.  
I also found that once I controlled for the state of the economy via my Taylor Rule 
mechanism, the effect of the BankPresident was insignificant, compared to my first empirical 
strategy (in which I did not control for the state of the economy) where BankPresident was one 
of the few variables that was consistently significant. I had found in my first set of regressions in 
Table 3 that bank presidents were more likely to cast a dissent vote for tighter monetary policy, 
and less likely to cast a dissent for looser policy, than Board members. I had modeled my 
regression on the prior literature, using dissent votes as my dependent variable. This literature 
consistently found that bank presidents were more hawkish than Board members. I found that 
once I controlled for the state of the economy, it was Republicans, not bank presidents, who were 
hawkish.  
More generally, I found that controlling for the state of the economy was very important. 
Before doing this, as in my first empirical strategy, I had results that were often not significant 
and difficult to interpret. Controlling for the effect of economic conditions on interest rate 
decisions also undid the significance of some results (like the difference for Bank Presidents) 
that have appeared in prior research.  
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 The political independence of the Federal Reserve is back in the news with President 
Trump’s attacks on the Fed.  I did not find direct evidence of partisanship in the sense of 
Republicans and Democrats voting differently, but I did find evidence that FOMC voting 
patterns are different depending on the party of the President.  These results call for further 
digging to identify exactly what it is about the time periods of Republican Administrations that 


















 8.  Tables and Figures 
 











 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dissent 5077 0.066 0.249  
 
0 1 
LooserDissent 5077 0.019  0.138 0 1 
TighterDissent 5077 0.041  0.198  0 1 
OtherDissent 5077 0.006  0.078 0 1 
Chair 5077 0.091  0.288 0 1 
BankPresident 5077 0 .448  0.497  0 1 
BoardMember 5077 0.455  0.498 0 1 
AlternateMember 5077 0.006  0.075 
 
0 1 
Male 5077 0.885  0.319  0 1 
Female 5077 0.115  0.319  0 1 
White 5077 0.955  0.208  0 1 
Black 5077 0.041  0.198 0 1 
Asian 5077 0.002  0.040  0 1 
Other 5077 0.003  0.056 0 1 
BankingFinance 5077 0.382  0.486 0 1 
Government 5077 0.427  0.495 0 1 
Law 5077 0.075  0.263 0 1 
Consulting 5077 0.062  0.241  0 1 
AcademiaResearch 5077 0.509  0.500 0 1 
NonFinancialBusiness 5077 0.030  0.170 0 1 
PhD 5077 0.583  0.493 0 1 
MBA 5077 0.164  0.370 0 1 
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 LawEd 5077 0.118  0.322 0 1 
OtherDegrees 5077 0.183  0.387 0 1 
Republican 5077 0.460  0.498 0 1 
Democrat 5077 0.338  0.473 0 1 
Independent 5077 0.012  0.109 0 1 
Unidentifiable 5077 0.190  0.392 0 1 
Donation 5077 0.478  0.500 0 1 
NoDonation 5077 0.522  0.500 0 1 
RepublicanDonor 5077 0.222  0.416 0 1 
DemocratDonor 5077 0.247  0.432 0 1 
MixedDonor 5077 0.008  0.091 0 1 
RepublicanPresident 5077 0.593  0.491 0 1 
DemocratPresident 5077 0.407  0.491 0 1 
DegreeYear 4906 1962.496  15.698 1929 2002 
















 Table 2: Transformation of Existing Data into Vote Unchanged, Vote Increase, Vote Decrease 
Index 








1 no no  ✔  
1 yes no  ✔  
1 no yes ✔   
0 no no ✔   
0 yes no  ✔  
0 no yes   ✔ 
-1 no no   ✔ 
-1 yes no ✔   









23 ​A one in this column indicates that the FOMC voted to increase the rate, relative to the previous meeting. A zero 
indicates that the FOMC voted to keep the rate the same, relative to the previous meeting. A negative one indicates 
that the FOMC voted to decrease the rate, relative to the previous meeting. 
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 Table 3:​ ​Basic Dissent Regressions: Correlation Between Background Characteristics and the 
Probability of Dissent Voting  





























































































































































 Table 4a: Impact of Political Affiliation on FOMC Voting Behavior After Controlling for the 

















































































































Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend 
squared, and the time trend cubed. 
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 Table 4b: Impact of Political Affiliation on FOMC Voting Behavior After Controlling for the 

















































































































Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend 
squared, and the time trend cubed. 
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Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend 
squared, and the time trend cubed. 
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Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend 
squared, and the time trend cubed. 
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 Table 6a: ​Impact of Educational Attainment on FOMC Voting Behavior After Controlling for 






































































































































Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend squared, 
and the time trend cubed. 
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 Table 6b: ​Impact of Educational Attainment on FOMC Voting Behavior After Controlling for 






































































































































Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend 
squared, and the time trend cubed. 
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 Table 7a: ​Impact of Donor Partisanship on FOMC Voting Behavior While Controlling for the 























































































































Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend 
squared, and the time trend cubed. 
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 Table 7b: ​Impact of Donor Partisanship on FOMC Voting Behavior While Controlling for the 
























































































































Note: t-stats in parentheses.  All specifications include a constant, a time trend, the time trend 
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